Commentary: Anticipating the first moves of Indonesia president-elect Prabowo

SINGAPORE: On Oct 20, Prabowo Subianto will be inaugurated as the eighth president of Indonesia. His leadership will be shaped by his ability to deliver on his political promises while navigating significant developmental challenges.
The biggest question is, how will Prabowo lead the country? While definitive answers will be known in time, it may be useful to anticipate four areas of tension and challenge.
First, will Prabowo expand his Cabinet to accommodate his political allies? Such a move seems likely given his broad electoral coalition, which includes parties like his Gerindra, Golkar, the Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat), and the National Mandate Party (PAN).
This coalition, while essential for governing stability, presents challenges. Expanding the Cabinet could lead to a bloated and inefficient executive, as seen in previous administrations, including during outgoing President Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) second term.
There have been rumours about Cabinet composition, partly seen as problematic because of the anticipation that Prabowo’s Cabinet will be much bigger than Jokowi’s.
News reports speculate that as many as 44 to 46 ministers (and ministries) might take office. The new Ministerial Law, ratified on Sep 20, removed the cap of 34 for Cabinet positions, thus allowing future presidents to have free rein.
There are also speculations that new ministries and agencies will be created and existing ones overhauled or split up.
New coordinating ministries mentioned include one for Society, while new ministries may cover policy areas like Education, Research and Technology, Environment, Forestry, Creative Economy, Law, and Immigration and Penitentiary, and new agencies oversee Presidential Communication, Nutrition, and State Revenue.
Such expansion may mean that the Cabinet could suffer from ineffective coordination. More importantly, any institutional arrangement of new or even restructured state institutions will take considerable time.
As a result, the new Cabinet will not be able to work straight away on the programmes Prabowo has promised. At the substantive or technocratic level, a larger Cabinet dilutes policy focus, with ministers pursuing their own agendas rather than national priorities.
By including key political players in his Cabinet, however, Prabowo may be able to win political payoffs and create a more unified front in parliament, particularly if he offers Cabinet positions to the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). 
We may know the composition of the Cabinet earlier than Inauguration Day but some speculative reports mention several loyalists who could play prominent roles.
The names include Setyo Hadi, Sugiono, Rachmat Pambudi, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, Anggito Abimanyu, Burhanuddin Abdullah, and current Cabinet members like Pratikno, Azwar Anas, Airlangga Hartarto, Budi G Sadikin, and Erick Thohir.
The second aspect to anticipate is Prabowo’s main approach towards Indonesia’s development.
Prabowo’s political promise, summarised as “eight visions” or Asta Cita, provides a comprehensive strategy to address Indonesia’s socio-economic challenges. However, it is certain that not all of his campaign promises will be implemented, given the limited resources.
Prabowo will likely focus more on his list of “quick wins”, and his team may focus on achieving economic self-sufficiency and reindustrialisation, including downstreaming industries, continuing Jokowi’s legacy on this front.
In line with his ambitious target of achieving 7 to 8, even 9 per cent economic growth by the end of his first term in 2029, Prabowo will most likely look to recentralisation. This means bringing authority back to the central government and more assertive state intervention to ensure growth while tackling unemployment and reducing inequality.
The social protection schemes would support this drive, including his plans for free meals for students and children, and the expansion of social assistance.
To operationalise his approach, Prabowo would need effective governance. Some think that he may adopt former president Suharto’s approach: Establishing a sort of Sekretaris Presiden Pengendalian Operasi Pembangunan, or President’s Secretariat for the Oversight of Development Operations, as his main instrument to drive development.
This is basically a military approach: Treating development as akin to a military operation. This is already apparent in his approach towards free lunch/meals – under the new National Agency for Nutrition, which has a military-like command chain from the national to the sub-district level.
Prabowo’s alliance with Jokowi may not remain stable once the handover of power takes place.
Recent dynamics, particularly the national demonstrations on Aug 22 and the awkward revelation involving Gibran Rakabuming Raka’s alleged old social media accounts where the incoming vice president made crude jokes about Prabowo, and displayed racist and sexist attitudes (the Fufufafa saga), may have affected Prabowo’s relations with both Jokowi and Gibran.
Alongside questions about whether Prabowo will continue Jokowi’s plans, especially the construction of the new capital city, Nusantara, Prabowo’s presidency will be defined by his ability to navigate Indonesia’s complex political economy.
The success of his administration will depend on whether he can maintain the momentum of Jokowi’s achievements while carving out a distinct, forward-looking legacy for his own presidency.
Yanuar Nugroho is Visiting Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore and Senior Lecturer at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta, Indonesia. This commentary first appeared on ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s blog, Fulcrum.